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This study focuses on identifying constraints that inhibit sugarcane contractor 
performance in the small-scale sugar industry in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN). 
Information is drawn from a sample survey, conducted with 124 randomly selected 
contractors from 11 mill group areas of KZN between September 2002 and July 2003 
and case studies of contractors, sub-committee members and development officers 
conducted in eight mill group areas. Results show that contractors face institutional 
constraints (work allocation limitations, lack of performance incentives and high 
transaction costs, such as negotiation costs, the risk of a loss in work and contract 
default risk), cash flow problems, poor physical infrastructure and a lack of labour. It 
is expected that the promotion of a more competitive small-scale sugarcane contractor 
sector will alleviate many problems (such as work allocation limitations) faced by 
small-scale contractors, while providing incentives for their provision of higher 
quality and cheaper services to small-scale sugarcane growers (SSGs). Government 
also has a role in strategising the creation of land markets while providing improved 
rural infrastructure (district roads). Government also needs to ensure unbiased tribal 
court rulings, review the impacts of minimum wage legislation on contractors 
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Small-scale sugarcane growers (SSGs) form an integral part of the sugar 
industry in South Africa and contribute an estimated 15 percent to the 
total sugarcane crop. The viability of SSGs is important from both a 
rural development and economic perspective. Firstly, SSGs comprise 
primarily of previously disadvantaged black farmers who contribute to 
rural economic growth due to strong multiplier effects through the use 
of local contractor and labour services. Secondly, mills such as 
Amatikulu receive a high proportion of their sugarcane (approximately 
25 percent) from SSGs (Le Gal & Requis, 1999). However, a serious 
drawback of the small-scale grower sector is the farmers’ inability to 
efficiently plant, grow, cut and deliver cane to mills, considering the 
small size of their farms with an average of between 1,5 and 2 hectares 
of sugarcane (Le Gal & Requis, 1999). This is one reason for the 
emergence of small-scale sugarcane contractors. 
 
Small-scale sugarcane contractors are generally SSGs, who provide 
essential mechanical tasks (land preparation, crop maintenance and 
cane haulage) (Wiseman, 2003) and/or labour (sugarcane cutting) 
contracting services to fellow SSGs. However, the productivity of these 
contractors (e.g., timely haulage operations, low downtimes, 
competitive charge-rates) has been low with costly delays in 
transportation of sugarcane and unreliability of the service (Sokhela, 
1999). An improvement in the productivity of contractors in providing 
the services farmers need is expected to benefit contractors (lower costs 
and greater market share) and growers (higher quality services at 
competitive prices). Milling companies would also benefit through a 
more stable supply of higher-quality sugarcane to their mills.  
 
The study includes data that were collected between September 2002 
and July 2003 from 124 contractors, who were randomly selected from 
eleven sugar mill areas in KwaZulu-Natal. Contractors interviewed 
were all haulage contractors who have direct haulage (sugarcane 
haulage from field to mill) and indirect haulage (sugarcane haulage 
from field to loading zone) operations. The study also examines those 
institutions that are perceived by contractors, sub-committee members 
and development (extension) officers to have a negative influence on 
the productivity of contractors in the small-scale sugar industry. 
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It is hypothesised that the institutional framework in which contractors 
currently operate hinders their performance. Contractors are likely to 
face high transaction costs (e.g., ex ante costs such as contract 
negotiation costs, and ex post costs such as risk of contract default) and 
other constraints, such as cash flow problems and a lack of 
infrastructure, which have a negative impact on their operations. Good 
institutions, i.e. those reducing uncertainty and other transaction costs, 
are critical to promoting contractor productivity, and a need for 
institutional reform in the small-scale sugar industry has been identified 
(Le Gal & Requis, 1999; Wiseman, 2003). The formal entry requirements 
of a potential contractor sourcing work are discussed, while 
highlighting traditional or informal institutional impacts. Various 
factors (such as financial constraints, lack of competition and incentives, 
poor infrastructure) that currently have a negative impact on a 
contractor’s performance are also evaluated. The paper provides policy 
recommendations, through analyses of survey data, case study 
information and pure observation on ways to improve both the 
productivity and viability of small-scale sugarcane contractors in 
KwaZulu-Natal. It is suggested that promotion of a more competitive 
industry, for example, by extension officers of the sugar industry and 
provincial government, may alleviate many of the constraints placed 
upon contractors.  
 
2. AN OVERVIEW OF INSTITUTIONAL, TRANSACTION 
COST AND COMPETITION THEORY 
 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) combines economic theory with 
institutional economics (Langlois, 1986: 5). Although the term NIE 
originated from Oliver Williamson (Coase, 2000), the original theory 
came from Coase’s (1937) paper, The nature of the firm. The theory of NIE 
highlights transaction costs and the institutions promoted to lower 
them (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985). It also explains the evolution of 
institutions and assesses their economic performance, efficiency and 
distribution impacts (Kherallah & Kirsten, 2002).  
 
Transaction costs are the costs, including risk, of negotiating and 
concluding a separate contract for each exchange transaction that takes 
place in the market. Also included are intangibles (e.g., searching for a 
SSG with whom to contract), and contract monitoring and enforcement 
(North, 1990). Arrow (1970, cited in Dorward, 1999: 480) defines 
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transaction costs as “the costs of running the economic system”. 
Transaction costs include ex ante, mostly fixed costs (e.g., drafting and 
negotiating agreements), and ex post, mostly variable (e.g., moral 
hazard) costs (Eggertson, 1990, cited by Zylbersztajn, 2003). 
 
Institutions are seen as the “rules of the game” that shape human 
interaction and are put in place to reduce uncertainty. There are both 
formal (e.g., laws, markets, contracts) and informal (e.g., traditions, 
customs) institutions (North, 1990: 4). North (1990) points out that 
institutional theory and development begins with the individual human 
being for whom institutions are created. In the small-scale sugarcane 
sector in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) this can only be made possible by 
understanding the relationships between contractors and SSGs within 
their environment. Regarding institutional change, Ruttan and Hayami 
(1984) highlighted an endogenous theory of institutional innovation 
from a demand point of view with a brief explanation of the supply of 
institutional change. Bardhan (1989), however, better explains the 
supply of institutional change while highlighting resistance to change in 
the form of vested interests and power struggles within collective 
action, itself being a barrier to institutional change.  In the small-scale 
contracting sector there may be a demand for institutional change 
regarding contractors sourcing their own work, and organisations such 
as the South African Sugar Association (SASA) and the South African 
Sugarcane Research Institute (SASRI) may see benefits in promoting 
such change (supply). However, power interests within local 
associations and sub-committees may prevent this from happening. 
Unless potential losers are identified and compensated, changing the 
institutional environment may prove difficult because potential losers 
have the power to resist such change. 
 
Beghin and Fafchamps (1995:288) state that “good governance relates to 
government policies and institutions which promote markets and 
efficiency, by defining the rules of the game which allow transaction 
costs to be reduced and so enlarge the effective flow of goods and 
services.” Furthermore, Hay (1993) says that the promotion of economic 
efficiency is one intention of competition. Sandmo (2000:7) defines this 
economic efficiency as an “achievement of efficient resource allocation” 
or capital flow to sectors of production where the rate of return is 
highest. He further states that the aim of policy makers should be to 
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reduce prices to competitive levels, something that is only possible 
through the promotion of a competitive market. 
 
Porter’s five-forces model (Porter, 1985) identifies five forces that affect 
a contractor’s competitive state in a free market system: suppliers of key 
inputs, substitute products, potential new entrants, customers, and 
rivalry between competitors. Another important aspect to consider in a 
competitive market is the role of consumer (SSG) demand linked to 
product value. Kennedy, Harrison, Kalaitzandonakes, Peterson and 
Rindfuss (1997) define customer value as the perceived value of a 
product’s “bundle of benefits” relative to the price paid for the product. 
For a contractor to be competitive, this ratio needs to exceed that of his 
rivals. In the small-scale contracting sector in KZN there may be limited 
options for differentiation (hauling other products such as timber or 
water), and low-cost leadership may prove to be the defining factor for 
determining a contractor’s competitive advantage. Kennedy et al. (1997) 
maintain that cost competitiveness depends on variable costs (fuel, 
repairs and maintenance), sunk costs (larger investments such as 
specialised capital, e.g., cane carting equipment) and transaction costs 
(including risk). Good institutions, in part, are those that facilitate a 
competitive market while aiding a reduction in transaction costs. 
 
3. DATA SOURCES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPON-
DENTS 
 
Data were obtained from a survey conducted by Joint Venture3 and mill 
extension staff that interviewed 124 small-scale sugarcane contractors 
between September 2002 and July 2003. The study area includes eleven 
of the main small-scale sugarcane grower areas, namely Amatikulu, 
Entumeni, Eston, Felixton, Gledhow (including Glendale), Maidstone, 
Noodsberg, Pongola, Sezela, Umfolozi4 and Umzimkulu. Contractors 
that were interviewed included those randomly selected with 
replacement. The sample was drawn using a constant sampling fraction 
with the population being stratified. Stratification categories included 
                                                
3  Staff from both the South African Sugarcane Research Institute and the 
KwaZulu-Natal Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs who are 
currently working in partnership. 
4  The Umfolozi contractors were selected at random by mill extension staff 
operating in the area. 
S. Afr. Tydskr. Landbouvoorl./S. Afr. J. Agric. Ext., Nothard, Ortmann & Meyer 
Vol 34(1), 2005    




three topographical levels and whether a contractor conducted direct5 
or indirect6 haulage tasks. Characteristics of sample respondents are 
shown in Table 1. Furthermore, due to the low occurrence of contractors 
transporting high tonnages, all those contractors who were listed as 
transporting more than 10 000 tons of sugarcane per year were included 
in the sample (a total of 10 observations).  
 
Table 1:  Characteristics of sample small-scale sugarcane 
contractors in KwaZulu-Natal, 2002/03 (n=124) 
 
Characteristic  Education 
distribution (%) 
 
Age in years (mean) 52.4 No education  17.1 
Experience in years (mean) 9.9 Grade 8 or less 39.0 
Proportion of females (%) 13.1 Grade 9-11 18.7 
Other sources of income (%) 77.4 Grade 12 19.5 
Other skills (%) 53.2 Tertiary 5.7 
Tons transported/year 
(mean) 
6 295   
Tons transported/year 
(mean)* 
4 757   
 * Excluding contractors transporting more than 10 000 tons per year. 
 
Case studies were also conducted in eight small-scale grower areas to 
obtain the views of contractors, sub-committee members and 
development (extension) officers on institutional issues. The areas are 
distributed over the KwaZulu-Natal coastal and inland regions, 
including four Illovo mill areas (Eston, Sezela, Gledhow and Glendale) 
and four Tongaat-Hullett mill areas (Amatikulu, Maidstone, Entumeni 
and Felixton). Included in the interviews were contractors, members of 
sub-committees (locally organised groups of SSGs in small-scale 
sugarcane growing areas) and development officers. Case study 
interviews, both in person and by phone, were conducted between 
September 2002 and February 2004. 
 
                                                
5  Direct haulage entails hauling sugarcane from the field to the mill. 
6  Indirect haulage involves hauling sugarcane from the field to a loading zone. 
S. Afr. Tydskr. Landbouvoorl./S. Afr. J. Agric. Ext., Nothard, Ortmann & Meyer 
Vol 34(1), 2005    




4. INSTITUTIONS INFLUENCING SMALL-SCALE CONTRAC-
TOR ENTRY7 
 
In each study area, contractors enter the industry by way of similar 
methods. Differences in contractor entry do occur across areas, but the 
following sections highlight the common channels. Authorities and 
influential bodies within the industry, such as sub-committees 
(organised groups of SSGs in grower areas), local associations 
(representing the interests of all SSGs in their local mill areas and 
consist of local sub-committee members) and milling companies, do not 
formally recognize contractors who source work through channels that 
do not involve the sub-committees and/or local associations. However, 
only 41 percent of sample contractors had either sub-committees or 
local associations involved in their hiring. Fifty-three percent indicated 
grower involvement alone, while seven percent of respondents 
specified both grower and sub-committee/local association 
involvement. This indicates that over one-half of sample contractors do 
not view sub-committee and local association involvement in 
contractual matters, such as the signing of contracts/cessions, as 
significant as grower involvement, even though sub-committees 
allocate the tonnages for haulage to contractors. In some areas the sub-
committee has no involvement in the signing of cessions although 
cessions still need to pass through sub-committees to local associations 
or milling companies. 
 
Organisational structure influences the extent to which channels 
through which potential contractors enter the industry are formed. The 
organisations in the small-scale grower sector differ from those that are 
found in the commercial farming sector. Where commercial sugarcane 
growers are in direct contact with the Local Grower Council, small-scale 
growers operate via a different channel, namely through their 
respective sub-committees, local associations and mill cane committees 
(see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 shows that SSGs are in contact with their respective sub-
committees and contractors, not the Local Grower Council. The sub-
                                                
7  Section 4 includes information from sample survey and case study observations. 
Referencing is generally excluded from the text due to many individuals 
providing similar information. 
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Figure 1: Organisation of small-scale sugarcane growers and contractors  
 
(Source: Adapted from Le Gal & Requis, 1999: 4) 
 
committees are made up of and represent SSGs from sub-locations 
within each mill area, while the contractors are individuals that serve 
the SSGs. Not all areas have the same organizational structures, as some 
do not acknowledge local associations as having a right of influence 
over the sub-committees. 
 
4.1  The sub-committee’s role in sugarcane allocation to contractors 
 
Although sub-committees are locally organised groups of SSGs in each 
grower area it should be noted that due to most contractors being SSGs 
themselves, they are not excluded from sub-committee nomination. 
Regarding contractor entry, the first responsibility of the sub-committee 
is to ensure that contractors entering the industry have the necessary 
equipment (tractors, trailers), and that there is available tonnage to 
haul. They also need to ensure that contractors operating in their area 
are registered with the local association. Secondly, they act on behalf of 
all SSGs in the area, and will allocate contractors to individual SSGs (the 
number of SSGs greatly exceeds the number of contractors). A 
facilitator, appointed in each sub-committee, is the individual who 
takes charge of the allocation of work. The sub-committee also mediates 
cession forms signed by SSGs and contractors. Following the signing of 
cessions, the sub-committees will send them to the mill or local 
association. In 2003, the South African Cane Growers’ Association 
(SACGA) and Tongaat-Hulletts began a programme in the Maidstone 
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area whereby the Regional Cane Delivery Forum (RCDF) adopted the 
function of SSG cane allocation to contractors, previously administered 
by sub-committees. The RCDF has a code of conduct to be followed by 
all contractors operating in the area. Many sub-committees do not have 
a code of conduct, so unproductive contractors continue to be part of 
local associations. 
 
4.2 The local association’s role in contractor registration and setting 
charge-rate guidelines  
 
Local associations represent the interests of all SSGs in their local mill 
areas and consist of members from the numerous local sub-committees. 
The development of a local association often depends on the area’s 
tribal structure (e.g., Felixton, Gledhow and Glendale) where each local 
association is representative of a single chief’s area. This is done to 
minimise conflicts between different tribal members. Local associations 
are recognised by the industry as authoritative bodies and it is 
compulsory for contractors to register with them (Harding, 2003). 
Although direct contact with contractors is limited, the associations will 
receive applications from contractors for registration purposes. The 
associations will then need to register them, after which the contractors 
become part of the local association (most contractors would already be 
registered as SSGs). Registration aids payment whereby contractors are 
given contractor numbers that are used to identify the contractors 
responsible for hauling every load of SSG sugarcane. As mentioned 
previously, these numbers are forwarded to the respective mills that 
pay accordingly (i.e., each SSG’s load sent to the mill includes his 
contractor’s number; the contractor is then paid by the mill out of the 
SSG’s pay cheque). The local association also provides contractors with 
charge-rate guidelines for hauling SSG sugarcane. They are assisted in 
this matter by milling companies and regional economists. Rates are not 
set according to supply and demand for contractor services, but are 
estimates (not dependent on contractor costs). In some areas rates are 
merely increased by accounting for inflation (e.g., Amatikulu). 
 
4.3 The contractor’s role in sourcing work 
 
Wiseman (2003) states that most contractors are themselves SSGs and 
become contractors for two main reasons. The first is a need to 
diversify, while the second is the existence of low quality contractor 
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services (untimely haulage operations), a major cause of frustration for 
growers relying on them. Although different mill areas use slightly 
different methods, the basic steps taken by potential contractors to be 
recognised and receive work are as follows. Firstly, potential 
contractors need to approach the sub-committee to which they want to 
be affiliated (in some areas, local associations are approached first). This 
would normally be a sub-committee in their own communities, but 
contractors have also been found operating in other areas. These are 
normally close, or adjacent, to their own areas. At this stage, the sub-
committee checks a contractor’s machinery and available tonnage is 
totalled to see if work is available. Sub-committees expect potential 
contractors to only purchase machinery following the acceptance of 
their applications to do contract work. However, this rarely occurs, and 
contractors normally purchase their machinery before any consultation 
with the sub-committee is made in the hope of getting contract work.   
 
Once potential contractors are recognised by their sub-committees 
(through word of mouth) they need to register as contractors and get a 
contractor number (this finalises registration of the contractor with the 
local association). This is done through the local association in 
conjunction with the milling company. The milling company will then 
use the numbers to identify those contractors hauling sugarcane to the 
mills or zones for each grower. Registered contractors will be allocated 
SSGs to haul for, and both parties will sign cessions (the cessions 
remain binding for a single season and signing of cessions re-occur 
every year even if the grower uses the same contractor). This normally 
occurs at least once a month with different SSGs (as found in the Sezela 
area), but varies according to the preference of the sub-committee. The 
signing of cessions can re-occur randomly for some SSGs when their 
contractors have breakdowns and haulage has to be reallocated. Some 
mill areas have alternatives to cessions - for example, at the Glendale 
mill, cessions are not required, as contractors and corresponding SSGs 
are entered directly onto computer. When a contractor has work (this is 
allocated by the sub-committee) he is expected to complete that to 
which he has agreed. Work, however, is not always completed due to 
reasons both beyond (e.g., rain delays and mill breakdowns) and within 
(e.g., equipment downtime) the control of the contractor. When 
contractors have completed their allotted work, they receive guaranteed 
payment from the milling company in the form of a deduction from the 
SSG’s pay cheque. 
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The next section briefly highlights customary influences on the sugar 
industry, a core issue given the tribal influence on SSG and contractor 
operations in tribal areas. It lists factors inhibiting contractor 
performance in the small-scale sugar industry. These factors are 
identified from examining organisational structures, contractor work 
sourcing channels and customary influences. 
 
5. CUSTOMARY INSTITUTIONS INFLUENCING SMALL-
SCALE SUGARCANE FARMING IN KZN 
 
Customary law and tradition have great influence on the “rules of the 
game” in the small-scale sugarcane industry sector. Firstly, the origin of 
many small-scale sugar industry problems is believed to be the land 
tenure situation in tribal areas of KZN (Wynne, 2003). The SSGs need to 
employ contractors because it is not feasible to invest in the necessary 
tractors or machinery, due to the small size of their farms. The small 
farm size is the product of tribal land being allocated to households in 
the area without extending enforceable tenure rights. Land purchase or 
rental markets therefore are imperfect for rural area land-users. This 
places a restriction on, for instance, more productive SSGs because they 
cannot rent in or purchase land. Thus, SSGs remain small despite the 
associated constraints, such as diseconomies of size. Also, much land 
lies idle and uncultivated, which is the result of an imperfect rental 
market (Fenwick & Lyne, 1999). Many SSGs are exiting the sugar 
industry (Wiseman, 2003), and the allocation of their land to other, more 
productive SSGs may consolidate land in SSG areas and promote their 
long-run viability.   
 
A further problem associated with the lack of land rights is the inability 
of landowners to use their land as collateral for loans because tribal 
owned land cannot be repossessed or sold (Fenwick & Lyne, 1998). 
Land would only have collateral value under a sale market or long-term 
lease market. Furthermore, title deeds do not have value and so do not 
solve the land tenure problem except when they assist market transfers 
(Fenwick & Lyne, 1999). While the land issue is of great importance, it 
lies beyond the control of those directly involved in the sugar industry, 
namely the milling companies, SASA and SACGA. Although 
involvement by sugar industry players is necessary, overall 
responsibility rests with both the government and tribal authorities, 
highlighting a need for institutional change (tribal land market 
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institutions) that could promote the viability of small-scale contractors 
beyond the “confines” of the sugar industry.  
 
Thomson (1996) highlights potential steps in addressing the land tenure 
problem. These are (1) to gain support from the tribal authority by 
communicating potential advantages of a land market to them; (2) to 
identify what market constraints exist and then address each of these 
individually, i.e. insecure tenure, risk perceptions, or a combination of 
both; (3) to provide education that promotes institutional change and 
offer extension to facilitate land transactions, helping to reduce 
transaction costs faced by lessors and lessees; and (4) to provide 
institutional support in the form of monitoring the growth of the rental 
market and disputes between vested interest groups. 
 
Another impact of customary law is the method of settling 
disagreements. The sample of contractors suggests that only 36 percent 
settle disagreements privately, while 61 percent indicate that some form 
of group settlement is necessary (i.e. through sub-committees, 
associations, mill extension). Individuals are often either afraid or do 
not have the status or authority within their community to state their 
grievances with effect. For example, Bruce (1989) indicates that over 
diverse cultural settings, women, specifically widowed or single 
women, have a substantially lower social status than men. Wiseman 
(2003) confirms this for KZN by adding that, due to tradition, societies 
in the rural areas of KZN are patriarchal in nature. It is therefore 
expected that women would face greater legal uncertainty and thus 
higher transaction costs. Lyne (1996) also identifies this issue, stating 
that individuals having weak social status, in this case women, often 
face greater legal uncertainty when compared to the rural elite.  
 
Because contractors live in the same communities as both their 
growers/clients and competitors, promoting a competitive industry 
may prove difficult. This has also greatly influenced work allocation by 
sub-committees, as some have indicated that their work allocation is not 
dependent on the service quality of a contractor, but rather on work 
allocation equality for contractors from the sub-committee’s 
perspective. Due to the influence that traditional authorities (chiefs, 
elders) have in the small-scale sugarcane areas of KZN, it may be 
prudent that these authorities be included in any institutional change 
process. Thomson (1996: 83) found the inclusion of credible leaders, 
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such as chiefs and tribal councils, extremely important in bringing 
institutional change to the tribal areas. Good leaders may play 
important roles in upholding contractual obligations and enforcing land 
rights where government intervention may fail (enforcement in remote 
areas may be difficult for government officials due to a lack of 
personnel and legal infrastructure, such as rural courts). 
 
6. FACTORS INHIBITING SMALL-SCALE CONTRACTOR 
PERFORMANCE IN KZN 
 
Institutions of the small-scale sugar industry exist to decrease an 
individual contractor’s exchange and production costs by giving some 
structure to their interaction with SSGs, competitors and authoritative 
bodies such as sub-committees and local associations. The following are 
factors that constrain contractor performance in the industry; they are 
based on both the sample survey and case studies. These factors are not 
ranked and are listed in no specific order. 
 
6.1 High transaction costs 
 
Observations show that ex ante transaction costs faced by contractors, 
with respect to sourcing contract work, are high. The involvement of 
both sub-committees and associations leave contractors with much “red 
tape” and costs to manage (negotiation costs that include application for 
membership, approval and contract arrangements) over and above 
those faced by commercial contractors. Furthermore, due to the small 
size of growers, contractors need to find approval for many cessions, 
which adds to their transaction costs (sample average was 121 SSGs per 
contractor). Nevertheless, there are savings for contractors as they are 
assigned SSGs/clients, and therefore do not have to search for them. 
The risk of losing haulage work is also relatively high for contractors 
(even though 60-70 percent are normally assigned into the next year), as 
work allocated in one year is not necessarily allocated in the next. This 
not only creates uncertainty regarding work for the future, but also 
limits access to current loans, as lending institutions generally view 
contractors as short-term, and therefore high-risk, clients that cannot 
service long-term debt. Contractors have also mentioned the decreased 
amount of work allocated over recent years. This may be attributed to 
the recent drought, although, as with preceding drops in allocation, it 
could be the joint result of a declining number of SSGs and an over-
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supply of contractors (more than a free market would allow, where 
contractors have enough haulage work to take advantage of economies 
of size, allowing for competitive charge-rates). Ex post transaction costs 
are increased through the risk of contract default in the presence of legal 
uncertainty, especially for women contractors (of lower social standing) 
who make up approximately 13 percent of the total number of 
contractors.  
 
A New Institutional Economics approach endeavours to reduce 
transaction costs faced by contractors through institutional reform and 
would look for incentive compliant arrangements for improving 
contractor performance. This would not only involve decreasing the 
number of channels through which contractors need to go in order to 
attain work, but may also include provision of physical (roads) and 
legal (ensure similar standards for lower status individuals) 
infrastructure, information and education (Matungul, Lyne & Ortmann, 
2001). 
 
6.2 Limited access to medium-term finance 
 
With cessions being limited to one year, formal lending institutions see 
contractors as temporary entities. This is understandable, as contractors 
are never guaranteed work for the following season and although 
commercial contractors face the same problem, their historical records 
reflect performance, which is not the case for small-scale contractors. 
This situation strengthens the perception of small-scale contractors as 
high-risk clients, since uncertainty is heightened in the minds of lenders 
regarding a contractor’s ability to service medium-term debt. With 
contractors sourcing loans for specialised equipment such as cane 
loaders and cane trailers, lending institutions doubt whether even a 
movement to another agricultural sector is possible in the event of a loss 
of sugarcane contracting work. Nevertheless, a good credit history may 
prove useful for contractors having sourced finance in the past. 
 
6.3 Business cash flow problems 
 
The inability to use land as collateral by SSGs operating in the tribal 
communities is a major limitation to raising loans. Furthermore, for 
current contractors, cash flow problems, due to payment delays, 
amplify an already precarious monetary situation. Wiseman (2003) 
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states that contractors may have to wait for up to two months to receive 
payment for their services. This causes cash flow problems, particularly 
at the beginning of the cutting season. Cash flow problems may also be 
attributed to injudicious financial planning, as funds should be saved 
from the previous season. This problem could be alleviated, as it is 
believed that payment within seven days to SSGs and therefore 
contractors may be possible (Wiseman, 2003).  
 
6.4 Differences in relative bargaining power, and lack of customer 
(SSG) contact  
 
Women in rural KZN have less bargaining power than men within their 
communities, due to their lower social status. A large proportion of 
SSGs are women, while most contractors are men. Therefore, a problem 
may exist in which contractors have greater bargaining power, which is 
amplified through the high SSG to contractor ratio. Wiseman (2003) 
indicates that this also influences price setting, as the bargaining power 
of contractors also carries through to these negotiations. Weak social 
status would not be limited to women, but also to men through the 
traditional hierarchical system, i.e. those with more authority are chiefs, 
traditional council members, elders, and long-standing community 
members (Berry, 1993; Fenwick & Lyne, 1998). This sets a double 
standard in transaction costs faced by different members within a 
community, thus hampering competition amongst contractors. For 
example, Norton (2003) stated that an authoritative figure from an 
undisclosed community posed a threat to the lives of other contractors 
who had entered his area seeking to expand their contracting business. 
Although community members acknowledged that the other 
contractors were better performers, the bulk of available work remained 
with the authoritative figure due to allocations being subjective. 
 
Regarding grower contact, the first step formally taken by contractors is 
not to approach the SSGs whom they are to serve, but rather the sub-
committees. The sub-committee may consist of one or more SSGs whom 
the contractor may serve, but would exclude the majority of his 
customers. Throughout the entire process, from industry entry to 
payment, formal contact between contractors and their customers 
(SSGs) is limited, except when cessions are signed. Customer 
preferences are not signalled through these administered transactions, 
which highlights a need for contractors to establish closer ties with the 
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SSGs in order to identify customer needs and thereafter provide 
services of higher quality (i.e. timely services, acceptable charge-rates). 
It can be expected that a good relationship between contractors and 
SSGs would improve contractor performance and service to growers. 
 
6.5 Limitations on growth of business size 
 
Ninety-one percent of the sample contractors said that they wanted to 
increase the tonnage they transport (Table 2). However, 72 percent 
indicated that this would be possible. Only 52 percent said that they 
needed more machinery to do so, which indicates that there are other 
constraints on business growth, such as the work limitations placed 
upon contractors through tonnage allocation. However, the need for 
more machinery probably indicates that the quality of machinery 
currently in use by contractors is poor. Although many contractors are 
hauling low tonnages, additional tractors are needed on standby to 
ensure haulage continues in the event of a breakdown. 
 
The administrative allocation of work by sub-committees shows 
immediate problems with regard to work limitations for contractors 
and with no exit mechanism for inefficient contractors, quotas are 
getting smaller. Furthermore, the guarantee of work, although limited, 
would be a contributing factor to the lack of performance incentives and 
competition. Given that machinery utilization would be a key factor for 
successful contracting, the ability to expand or grow such business 
becomes extremely important if size economies are to be achieved.  
 
Table 2:  Potential for increased work tonnages of sample contractors, 
2002/03 (n=124) 
 
Response Can increase tonnage (%) 





Yes 72 91 52 
No 28 9 48 
 
6.6 Lack of competition and performance incentives 
 
Institutional barriers currently inhibit competition in the small-scale 
sugarcane contractor sector in KZN. One barrier is the control of work 
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allocation exercised by sub-committees. Work allocation not only 
inhibits business growth but also prevents competition. Furthermore, 
charge-rate guidelines, normally followed closely by contractors (most 
of whom lack own cost information), also inhibit competition. Wiseman 
(2003) states that rates are determined by allowing for the viability of all 
operating contractors, including those hauling low tonnages, regardless 
of actual contractor costs or service quality. Small-scale growers are 
then faced with higher than market charge-rates and in some cases 
these rates are nearly double those charged by commercial contractors. 
Wiseman (2003) further states that restructuring needs to take place in 
order to ensure that contractors entering the industry do not exceed the 
number needed, i.e. the number determined by the market demand for 
contractors. Some contractors are lured to contracting for reasons of 
status or recognition rather than money. A competitive contracting 
market would eliminate high cost and poor-performing contractors.  
 
The potential sources of a contractor’s competitiveness need to be 
identified. Firstly, diversification may be an option in that contractors 
may offer other services (e.g., hauling timber and water), which would 
improve economies of size and, therefore, overall returns. Improved 
services may be a second option, such as consistently providing a 
reliable haulage service. An important benefit of contractor competition 
for SSGs would be lower cost services. However, contractors are faced 
with a limited customer target market, due to the high costs associated 
with the delivery of services outside of their own area (high cost of 
transporting their tractors). This may only prove profitable if 
contractors can charge a premium price, an unlikely event given the 
alternatives open to SSGs (i.e. access to commercial contractors, and 
local contractors offering similar services).  
 
6.7 A lack of suitable labour 
 
The lack of labour poses a problem for some small-scale contractors. 
Few labourers are needed for machinery operations (driving tractors, 
cranes, cane loaders, etc.), but a large number of labourers are required 
for sugarcane cutting tasks. Many haulage contractors are involved in 
cutting sugarcane, which allows for diversification of their businesses. 
Although only 17 percent of sample contractors directly referred to a 
low availability of labour, there is a concern about the relatively more 
attractive higher wages in the commercial sector (now paying minimum 
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wages that far exceed those paid by small-scale labour contractors) and 
the impact of HIV/Aids, which negatively effects labour productivity. 
Some contractors travel up to 20 kilometres away to source labour. 
 
6.8 Poor rural infrastructure 
 
Although institutions in the small-scale contractor sector encompass the 
“rules” by which contractors interact, for market forces to function, i.e. 
with lower transaction costs, adequate physical infrastructure needs to 
be in place (Timmer, 1992, and Sahn & Sarris, 1994; both cited by 
Fenwick and Lyne, 1999). The study sample suggests that 76 percent of 
contractors see the lack of infrastructure as a problem that increases not 
only transaction costs (Fenwick and Lyne, 1999) but also their basic 
haulage costs via increased wear and tear on machinery and increased 
fuel usage. Further losses occur through decreased access to available 
tonnages in secluded fields. Wiseman (2003) calls for urgent 
intervention by government to improve road infrastructure in the 
small-scale sugar industry. Furthermore, adding to the severe effects of 
poor infrastructure, sugarcane fields in remote areas of the industry add 
to the costs faced by contractors. Observation shows that fields are often 
inaccessible due to harsh terrain (steep slopes).  
 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Access to contract work remains limited for better performing 
sugarcane contractors in KZN due to the administrative allocation of 
work by sub-committees (or in the Maidstone area, by the RCDF). These 
institutions remove performance incentives by setting prices and 
allocating work subjectively. Small-scale growers do not have 
bargaining power and so penalties for contractors providing a poor 
service do not exist (a competitive market would solve this problem by 
eliminating poor performers). Instead of reducing transaction costs, 
current institutions, such as administrative organisation, increase costs 
by adding unnecessary channels through which contractors need to 
proceed. Seemingly an obvious problem and widely discussed in the 
small-scale sugarcane industry, tonnage allocation remains a 
constraining factor on contractor business growth. This problem gives 
rise to the need for institutional reform aimed at promoting 
competition. 
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Contractors and SSGs need to interact more in addition to the signing of 
cessions. This would allow SSGs to communicate their “product value” 
expectations (e.g., timely haulage expectations) to contractors. For 
example, a contractor’s untimely haulage operations negatively affect a 
grower’s income via lower Recoverable Value (RV) payments (farmers’ 
payments are based on the quality sugar content of sugarcane delivered 
to mills). Growers need to be able to communicate their grievances to 
the contractors if performance improvements are to be promoted. A 
solution may be for SSGs to choose their own contractors within a 
competitive sector where poor service providers would have the 
potential for exclusion from selection.  
 
Changes in payment terms for contractor services are necessary in that 
contractors need to be more motivated to ensure that sugarcane reaches 
mills before RV levels drop. Thus, payments to contractors based not 
only on tonnage delivered, but also on RV, may reduce haulage delays. 
For example, the payment system may be based partly on RV and 
partly on tonnage depending on industry requirements. However, if 
this payment system were to be adopted, delivery of low quality cane 
by contractors would decline unless premium prices were paid to cover 
the extra haulage costs. Contractors may be justified in charging higher 
prices for harvesting poor cane. This may inevitably drive SSGs that 
produce low quality cane from the industry, further highlighting the 
need for a land (rental) market allowing high quality cane producing 
SSGs to rent in more land. Also, due to contractors having limited 
access to finance and a high liquidity preference (continuing operations 
with respect to fuel and repairs), earlier payment for their service needs 
to be seriously considered by milling companies. This is possible, as 
information on which contractor delivered the cane and the value of 
cane delivered is said to be available well within the one to two month 
payment time. Less delay in haulage payments would be highly 
beneficial to contractors in providing liquidity to fund day-to-day 
operations. Introducing this type of payment scheme may require 
preliminary adoption of a reduced payment delay (i.e. three to four 
weeks), with additional decreases (i.e. two weeks) being considered for 
the future, so as to allow mills to accustom themselves to quick 
payments (computer systems may need adjustment and staff trained to 
deal with shorter payment schedules). Although a payment system may 
need to be laid out for contractors, eventually market forces would 
decide upon charge-rates with contractors competing for work.   
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Regarding a competitive contractor sector, note must be taken of the 
bargaining power of contractors compared to SSGs. Policy makers must 
not overlook this relationship as short-term abuse of bargaining power 
over SSGs may result if contractors are to be allowed to set their own 
prices. In the long run, however, prices would be driven down by 
competition amongst contractors, especially after the size expansion of 
contractors and them taking advantage of economies of size (lower 
average cost per ton). The development of a competitive sector may be 
realisable, in that the situation already exists in Mpumalanga (Komati 
and Malelane) where commercial contractors, some being SSGs 
themselves, are contracting to SSGs under competitive conditions. 
 
Before discussing potential steps in moving towards a competitive 
sector, it is necessary to mention those contractors who may lose with 
regards to own vested interests and power relations, i.e. those that 
would oppose institutional change. Firstly, many contractors may need 
to exit the industry with their work being taken up by more productive 
contractors (quality service providers regarding timeliness and charge-
rates). There is no indication of this number; however, most contractors 
may need to more than double their haulage levels to at least 10 000 
tons to break-even. This implies that a potential drop of 50 percent of 
currently operating contractors may occur. Others with vested interests 
would be those in authoritative positions on local associations and sub-
committees. However, these institutions may still be useful in providing 
information, for contract monitoring and/or contract enforcement. 
Further costs would be faced by, for example, milling companies where 
computer administration would have to change in the form of new 
computer programs and staff training. This may, therefore, also invoke 
some resistance to change. 
 
Potential steps in moving towards a more competitive contractor sector 
include: 
 
• Allow contractors to source their own work. Contractors do not have 
to work through channels to get jobs beyond personal dealings with 
the SSGs. Also, a milling company payment scheme is not 
necessarily needed, although this may guarantee payments to 
contractors. 
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• Current extension services (joint venture and milling company) need 
to communicate the benefits of competition to both SSGs and 
contractors (lower charge-rates through cost cuts by contractors, 
improved service quality for SSGs, ability to expand contracting 
business and make use of economies of size for contractors, and 
freedom to choose clients). 
 
• The authority of associations and sub-committees should be limited 
to the provision of information, mediation and arbitration of 
disputes, and contract enforcement, despite the vested interests of 
individuals within these authoritative positions. 
 
• Make allocated tonnages transferable between contractors at prices 
set by contractors themselves. This would move current allocations 
to more efficient contractors willing to pay the highest price per 
transfer. 
 
• Any support (information, extension advice) that contractors need 
should be provided by extension services already in place. If the 
request for information exceeds what can be provided, charges need 
to be made to reduce the training/information requirements to 
levels that are deliverable (this will promote more efficient allocation 
of resources, such as information inputs, to better performing 
contractors). 
 
• A short-term solution to contractors determining charge-rates may 
be to provide a list of potential charge-rates or price information (by 
extension services) of all contractors in an area (this may be the sub-
committee area or wider depending on distance costs to contractors). 
This could drive charge-rates down, as SSGs will likely try to source 
the lower cost providers.  
 
• It needs to be clearly communicated to SSGs that contractors are 
service providers and that the SSGs are their customers. There must 
be a demand for high quality service in order to drive service levels 
up to acceptable standards (i.e. a more competitive industry 
structure will improve service quality by contractors jockeying for 
competitive advantage). This does not occur at present because SSGs 
are allocated to contractors and therefore are not voluntary clients. 
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In effect, those contractors who are not cost effective and/or deliver 
poor quality services may exit the market leaving least-cost provider 
contractors in the industry. However, competition might be limited to 
contractors within the same areas, as delivering such a service over a 
wide geographical area may prove too costly for contractors. 
 
From a development perspective, it would take time for the remaining 
small-scale contractors to reach commercial levels of competitive 
advantage, i.e. commercial charge-rate levels and commercially 
acceptable standards of service. It may, therefore, be necessary to 
protect areas where commercial contractors have access, in the short-
term, to prevent the small-scale contractor sector from collapsing (i.e. 
leave authority of area, not individual, allocation to sub-committees in 
the short-term so contractors compete only amongst themselves in their 
own areas). 
 
Porter (1985) outlines an essential approach for contractors operating in 
a competitive sector. It would be necessary for contractors to guarantee 
sources of key inputs (e.g., a continuous supply of fuel for day-to-day 
operations, and readily available repair services). Contractors would 
need to be able to compete with fellow small-scale contractors and 
commercial contractors, and to deter potential new entrants by building 
up a competitive advantage (e.g., ensure services are of a high standard 
(timely operations) and that prices are competitive). Contractors need to 
be aware of an expected increase in the bargaining power of SSGs as the 
SSG’s ability to change contractors would be increased in a more 
competitive market. 
 
The government may have a role in improving small-scale contractor 
performance through a change in government policy and institutions. 
Firstly, government could consider creating formal land markets under 
informal constraints (tribal authority), in partnership with those directly 
involved in the sugar industry (SASA, milling companies, SACGA). 
Thomson’s (1996) steps in addressing the land tenure problem may be 
an approach that could be used by both government and others 
involved in the industry. 
 
Secondly, government needs to direct more funding towards improving 
rural infrastructure, such as roads, which would reduce haulage costs 
and improve communication. Groups of SSGs (e.g., sub-committees) 
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could invest in road maintenance equipment (subsidisation by 
government may be required) and maintain infield roads for those in 
their area. District road maintenance would remain the responsibility of 
government. Furthermore, it may also be necessary for extension staff to 
advise potential SSGs to avoid planting sugarcane in remote areas, as 
contractors under a competitive situation may not be willing to haul 
their sugarcane.   
 
Thirdly, government needs to ensure that tribal courts do not run a dual 
system of decision but that all contracts are enforced consistently 
regardless of social status, i.e. there needs to be monitoring over tribal 
rulings and places of appeal for those with grievances regarding these 
rulings. Fourthly, labour legislation should be seriously reconsidered 
regarding the minimum wage bill, as many small-scale contractors 
simply cannot pay the legal wage to their unskilled labour, due to their 
already high operating costs (high transaction costs, diseconomies of 
size). Lastly, protection of those competing for work needs to be made 
available. “Mafia” type behaviour and abuse of authority in communal 
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